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MERGENS V. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF WESTSIDE
COMMUNITY SCHOOLS: EQUAL ACCESS UPHELD AS
THE LEMON TEST SOURS
INTRODUCTION
Public high schools throughout the United States allow a wide variety of
student groups and clubs to meet on their facilities. A typical high school
has a student government, several language clubs, a chess club, a debate
team, a ski club and a variety of other student groups reflecting the interests
of the students at the individual high school. However, when a group of
students wishing to form a club that would meet and discuss their interest
in religion, attempts to hold its meetings on public high school grounds,
school authorities typically have denied that privilege to them. Public high
schools around the country fear that allowing student religious groups to
meet creates an impermissible establishment of religion.
The Equal Access Act ("EAA" or "Act")' addresses the problem
faced by student religious groups that wish to meet on public high school
1. 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (Supp. 11 1984) [hereinafter "EAA" or "Act"]. The EAA provides:
(a) Restriction of limited open forum on basis of religious, political, philosophical
or other speech content prohibited
It shall be unlawful for any public secondary school which receives Federal financial
assistance and which has a limited open forum to deny equal access or a fair
opportunity to, or discriminate against, any students who wish to conduct a meeting
within that limited open forum on the basis of the religious, political, philosophical,
or other content of the speech at such meetings.
(b) "Limited open forum" defined
A public secondary school has a limited open forum whenever such school grants
an offering to or opportunity for one or more noncurriculum related student groups
to meet on school premises during noninstructional time.
(c) Fair opportunity criteria
Schools shall be deemed to offer a fair opportunity to students who wish to conduct
a meeting within its limited open forum if such school uniformly provides that -
(1) the meeting is voluntary and student-initiated;
(2) there is no sponsorship of the meeting by the school, the government, or its
agents or employees;
(3) employees or agents of the school or government are present at religious
meetings only in a nonparticipatory capacity;
(4) the meeting does not materially and substantially interfere with the orderly
conduct of educational activities within the school; and
(5) nonschool persons may not direct, conduct, control, or regularly attend
activities of student groups.
(d) Federal or State authority nonexistent with respect to certain rights
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize the United States or any
State or political subdivision thereof-(l) to influence the form or content of any
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grounds.2 The EAA prohibits public secondary schools receiving federal
financial assistance from denying access to student groups on the basis of
the groups' religious, political or philosophical speech.3 Several courts, how-
ever, have circumvented the requirements of the EAA and have continued
to deny equal access to public high school students.4 In February, 1989, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the EAA in Mergens v. Board of
Education.5 The Eighth Circuit ultimately reached the correct decision in
affirming the constitutionality of the EAA. However, it is clear that under
the present test applied by courts to determine whether a statute or policy
violates the establishment clause6 the EAA would not pass muster.
prayer or other religious activity;
(2) to require any person to participate in prayer or other religious activity;
(3) to expend public funds beyond the incidental cost of providing the space for
student-initiated meetings;
(4) to compel any school agent or employee to attend a school meeting if the
content of the speech at the meeting is contrary to the beliefs of the agent or
employee;
(5) to sanction meetings that are otherwise unlawful;
(6) to limit the rights of groups of students which are not of a specified numerical
size; or
(7) to abridge the constitutional rights of any person.
(e) Unaffected Federal financial assistance to schools
Notwithstanding the availability of any other remedy under the Constitution or the
laws of the United States, nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to authorize
the United States to deny or withhold Federal financial assistance to any school.
(f) Authority of schools with respect to order-and-discipline, well-being, and vol-
untary-presence concerns
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to limit the authority of the school,
its agents or employees, to maintain order and discipline on school premises, to
protect the well-being of students and faculty, and to assure that attendance of
students at meetings is voluntary.
2. The EAA was signed into law on August 11, 1984.
3. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a) (Supp. 11 1984).
4. See, e.g., Garnett v. Renton School Dist., 865 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1989) (public high
school did not provide a "limited open forum," as defined by the EAA, as the school district
policy required that student activities be curriculum related); Clark v. Dallas Indep. School
Dist., 671 F. Supp. 1119 (N.D. Tex. 1987) (where prior constitutional interpretation of the
Fifth Circuit is contrary to the provision of the EAA, the Act will not be applied because
constitutional interpretation can only be overruled by constitutional amendment and not by act
of Congress); Thompson v. Waynesboro Area School Dist., 673 F. Supp. 1379 (M.D. Pa. 1987)
(distribution of religious literature in the hallways of a public junior high school was not a
"meeting" under the EAA and, therefore, not protected by the Act); Perumal v. Saddleback
Valley Unified School Dist., 198 Cal. App. 3d 64, 243 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1988) (as long as school
district maintains a closed forum policy, it may constitutionally refuse to recognize religious
groups).
5. 867 F.2d 1076 (8th Cir. 1989).
6. The present test applied by courts to determine whether a statute or policy violates the
establishment clause was set forth by the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602
(1971). See discussion of the requirements set forth in Lemon infra notes 75-77 and accompa-
nying text.
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This Note will show that students' free speech and free exercise rights
outweigh any threat of an establishment clause violation in cases involving
equal access to public secondary schools, thus supporting the outcome in
the Mergens decision. The Note will begin by discussing the constitutional
rights of high school students and then examine the establishment clause
concerns present when government allows students equal access to a high
school activities forum. This Note will also examine the constitutionality of
the Equal Access Act and the scope of its applicability. Finally, this Note
will attempt to show the insufficiency of the present test for establishment
clause violations and the need for a new formulation to examine establish-
ment clause concerns.
I. BACKGROUND
Any examination of an equal access policy in public secondary schools
involves the balancing of two opposing constitutional concerns. These con-
cerns are, on the one hand, the interest in protecting the students' free
speech and free exercise of religion rights and, on the other hand, the threat
of an establishment clause violation.
A. Free Speech Rights
1. In General
The first amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law ...
abridging the freedom of speech." ' 7 Not all speech, however, is protected by
the first amendment. Obscenity," advocacy of imminent lawless behavior,9
7. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
8. The Supreme Court first described obscenity as not within the area of constitutionally
protected speech in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
The Court established the present day test for obscenity in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15
(1973). The test asks the following:
(a) whether the average person, applying contemporary community standards, would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether
the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
9. Advocacy of lawless action was first addressed by the Court in the landmark case of
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), in which Justice Holmes introduced the "clear
and present danger" test. Id. at 52.
The present day test for advocacy of imminent lawless behavior was enunciated by the Court
in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). Under the test the advocacy must be: (I) "directed
to inciting or producing imminent lawless action" and (2) "likely to incite or produce such
action." Id. at 447.
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and defamation '° are examples of categories of speech which have been
denied first amendment protection by the Supreme Court. In general, there-
fore, speech which does not fall into an unprotected category of speech will
receive first amendment protection." However, even speech which is fully
protected by the first amendment can sometimes be restricted by the gov-
ernment. Whether these governmental restrictions will be upheld depends on
the nature of the restriction and the forum in which the speech occurs.
Government restrictions on speech can be divided into two broad cate-
gories." Under the first category, the government restriction is aimed at the
ideas or information conveyed by the speaker. 3 Restrictions in this category
are commonly referred to as content-based restrictions on speech.' 4 The
government cannot make content-based restrictions on speech absent a com-
pelling state interest and a showing that the restriction was narrowly drawn
to achieve that interest.' 5
Under the second category, the government restricts the flow of infor-
mation and ideas without aiming at ideas or information. 6 Restrictions in
this category have been termed content-neutral." Courts analyzing content-
neutral restrictions apply a balancing test which examines the extent to which
communicative activity is inhibited against the interests served by enforcing
the inhibition."
10. The Supreme Court initially gave no first amendment protection to defamatory speech.
In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942), the Court classified libel as wholly
outside first amendment protection. Today, however, the exclusion of defamation from first
amendment protection is not absolute. In order to maintain a libel suit, a public official must
show that the defamatory statement was made with "actual malice." This means that the public
official must show that the statement was made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless
disregard of whether it was true or false. New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
Private individuals, on the other hand, need not prove "actual malice" but are still required
to show simple negligence. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
11. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72, where the Court stated that there are certain limited
classes of speech, the restriction of which does not pose any constitutional problem. The Court
then gives examples including "the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous and the insulting
or 'fighting' words." Id.
12. L. TRIE, AmESUcAN CoNsTrruTIoNAL LAW § 12-2, at 789 (1988).
13. Id.
14. Id. § 12-2, at 794-97. One who is convicted for wearing a jacket bearing the words
"Fuck The Draft" in the corridor of a county courthouse is the subject of a content-based
restriction on speech. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
Another example of a content-based restriction on speech would be a ban on the teaching
of a foreign language. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
15. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 270 (1981) (upholding the right of an evangelical
Christian group to meet on university facilities); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980)
(striking down a statute which allowed peaceful labor picketing of residences or dwellings).
16. L. TRIBE, supra note 12, § 12-2, at 789.
17. A government restriction on the use of sound trucks which emit loud noises while
operating on the streets is an example of a content-neutral restriction on speech. See Kovacs
v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
Another example of a content-neutral restriction on speech is a government restriction on
the distribution of all leaflets. See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
18. L. TRIBE, supra note 12, § 12-23, at 979.
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In addition to reviewing the nature of the restriction, courts must look to
the nature of the forum in which the speech has occurred.19 Courts recognize
three types of public fora. The first is the "traditional public forum" or
"open forum." Open fora are "places which by long tradition or by gov-
ernment fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate." 0 In an open
forum, such as a street or a public park, the state may not prohibit all
communicative activity. 2 The state may, however, enforce a content-based
exclusion in an open forum, if it shows "that its regulation is necessary to
serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve
that end."'22 Content-neutral restrictions in an open forum will only be
upheld if they are narrowly tailored to achieve a significant government
interest and ample alternative means for communication are left open. 23
A second type of forum is the "limited open forum." The limited open
forum consists of "public property which the state has opened for use by
the public as a place for expressive activity.'' A municipally owned theater25
and the grounds of a state fair 26 are examples of areas which the Supreme
Court has held to constitute limited public fora. The limited public forum
status is revocable by the government and its existence is contingent on the
government's intent to create such a forum. 27 Although the government is
not required to maintain a limited open forum indefinitely, as long as it
does so, it will be bound by the same standards that apply to traditional
public fora.21
Finally, any other public property falls into the category of nonpublic
fora. Prisons29 and city transit systems 0 are examples of nonpublic forums.
19. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 799-80 (1985).
20. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
21. Id.
22. Id. (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)).
23. Id. (citing United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S.
114, 132 (1981); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535-36 (1980);
Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 306-
07 (1940); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939)).
24. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
25. It is important to note that a municipally owned theater does not become a limited
open forum merely because it is municipally owned. It is the government's intent to open the
forum for expressive activity that creates the open forum. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd.
v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975) (the Court held that the theaters involved were "public
forums designed for and dedicated to expressive activities").
26. See Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 655
(1980) (the state fair "is a limited public forum in that it exists to provide a means for a great
number of exhibitors temporarily to present their products or views").
27. Laycock, Equal Access and Moments of Silence: The Equal Status of Religious Speech
by Private Speakers, 81 Nw. U.L. REV. 1, 46 (1986).
28. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46.
29. See Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977) (a prison is
not a public forum because the exercise of free speech rights by the inmates would sometimes
conflict with the operations of the prison).
30. See Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (a city transit system is not a first
amendment forum since it is not a public thoroughfare with open spaces and passengers are a
captive audience).
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The government can restrict a speaker's access to a nonpublic forum provided
that the restriction is "reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression
merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view."',
To date, courts have not readily classified public high schools as any
particular type of forum. 2 The Supreme Court has held, however, that a
newspaper created as part of a high school journalism class is not an open
forum and that school officials could regulate the contents of the newspaper
in any reasonable manner.3" As equal access cases involve access to a high
school activities forum, courts must determine what type of forum a public
high school has created when allowing an activity's program on its facilities.
In examining any free speech issue, the Court has held that where a public
forum a4 exists, discrimination against speech will only be permissible if the
state has a compelling interest and the restriction is narrowly drawn to
achieve that end. While this is the case for adults in a public forum, the
standard changes somewhat when considering students in the public high
school setting."
2. Students' Free Speech Rights
The United States Supreme Court expressed its willingness to construe
student expression in the public high school setting as protected speech in
the landmark case of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School Community
District. 3 6
The Court held that students in public schools do not "shed their consti-
tutional rights to freedom or expression at the schoolhouse gate." 37 In Tinker,
31. Perry, 420 U.S. at 46.
32. A public high school certainly would not constitute a traditional public forum since
that category applies to fora which are open to the entire population. It may be considered a
limited public forum, but this classification is also problematic. The existence of a limited
public forum is contingent on the government's intent to create it and is revocable at anytime.
The Supreme Court protected high school students' right to speak in Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). Nothing in Tinker suggests that student's
rights depend on the school's intent to grant those rights nor does anything in Tinker suggest
that a school can revoke students' constitutional rights at any time. Id. This leaves the possibility
that public high schools are nonpublic fora. Although this classification would appear somewhat
restrictive of students' rights and inconsistent with the Tinker holding, the case law suggests
that public high schools would best be characterized as nonpublic fora.
For a discussion of where schools fit in forum analysis see Laycock, supra note 27, at 45-49
(Laycock suggests that the best view is to consider schools as open fora for students and faculty
where students and faculty are free to discuss any topic but where the rest of the world is
excluded).
33. Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
34. Be it an open forum or a limited forum.
35. Hazelwood School Dist., 484 U.S. at 266 ("[T]he First Amendment rights of students
in the public schools are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings
and must be applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment.") (citations
omitted).
36. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
37. Id. at 506.
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two public high school students and a junior high school student were
suspended from school after wearing black armbands in school to protest
the hostilities in Vietnam.38 The Court held that the wearing of armbands
was protected speech under the first amendment and that the students'
speech could not be restricted unless school authorities had reason to believe
that such expression would "substantially interfere with the work of the
school or impinge upon the rights of other students."3 9
Although students' first amendment rights have suffered setbacks in cases
since Tinker,4 the Tinker holding remains good law.4 1 In order to justify a
content based discrimination against a student's speech, therefore, the state
must show that the restriction is necessary to avoid a substantial interference
with school discipline or the rights of others.4 2
The Supreme Court has also held that religious speech by public university
students is within the first amendment protection. In Widmar v. Vincent,
43
the Court held that college students' religious worship and discussion are
"forms of speech and association protected by the First Amendment"" and,
38. Id. at 504. The principals of the Des Moines area schools, after learning of the students'
plan to wear armbands, adopted a policy that any student wearing an armband to school and
refusing to take it off would be suspended. Id.
39. Id. at 509.
40. See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (school officials
may censor school sponsored publication as long as the censorship action is reasonably related
to a legitimate pedagogical concern); Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986)
(upholding school officials' decision to discipline student for vulgar and lewd speech and stating
that adult standards of obscene speech do not apply to students); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. 325 (1985) (cutting back students' fourth amendment rights by holding that school officials
may conduct a search based on a mere reasonable suspicion rather than a finding of probable
cause).
41. That courts continue to cite Tinker in cases involving the constitutional rights of students
is evidence of the Tinker holding's continued vitality. See, e.g., Arnold v. Board of Educ., 880
F.2d 305, 314 n.11 (lth Cir. 1989); Alabama Student Party v. Student Gov't Ass'n, 867 F.2d
1344, 1346 (lth Cir. 1989); Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757, 762 (6th Cir. 1989); Burch v.
Barker, 861 F.2d 1149, 1154 (9th Cir. 1988). Even in the course of restricting student rights,
the Supreme Court consistently relies on Tinker to set the standard for the rights of public
high school students. See cases cited supra note 40.
42. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 513.
43. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
44. Id. at 269 (citing Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452
U.S. 640 (1981) (upholding restrictions on the distribution and sale of religious literature as
well as the solicitation of contributions by a Krishna religious group on the grounds of a state
fair because of state's compelling interest in the safety and convenience of people at the fair
but conceding that "the oral and written dissemination of the Krishna's religious views and
doctrines is protected by the First Amendment"); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951)
(granting to a Jehovah's Witnesses group, on equal protection grounds, the right to conduct
Bible talks in a public park where the City Council had denied the Jehovah's Witnesses a
permit to meet in the park while granting it to other religious groups); Saia v. New York, 334
U.S. 558 (1948) (upholding the right of a Jehovah's Witnesses minister to use a loud speaker
to amplify lectures on religious subjects delivered in a public park)). But see Widmar, 454 U.S.
at 284-86 (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that "religious worship" is not speech).
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therefore, granted a university student religious group the right to meet on
public university facilities. In Widmar, eleven students at the University of
Missouri, all members of a group named "Cornerstone," sought permission
to use school facilities for religious activities. 45 The university, however,
would not permit students to use its facilities "for purposes of religious
worship or religious teaching,"6 despite the fact that the university had
already recognized over 100 student groups.4 7 The Court held that the
university had created a limited open forum by opening its facilities for
general use by the recognized student groups. 48 The university, therefore,
could not make content-based discriminations against any group, religious
or otherwise. 49 The Court reasoned that the state's interest "in achieving
greater separation of church and state than is already ensured under the
establishment clause"50 was not sufficiently compelling to justify an impinge-
ment on the free speech and free exercise rights of the students.5, Thus, an
impingement on religious worship and discussion is considered a violation
of free speech rights.
Since high school students have free speech rights protected by the first
amendment and since religious worship and discussion are considered speech,
it follows that religious worship and discussion by high school students are
protected by the students' first amendment speech rights.5 2
B. Free Exercise of Religion Rights
In addition to the students' first amendment speech rights, equal access
policies raise the issue of the free exercise of religion. The Constitution's
free exercise clause53 guarantees freedom from governmental interference
45. Id. at 265-66. Cornerstone is made up of Evangelical Christian students from various
denominational backgrounds. Their meetings attracted up to 125 students and included prayer,
hymns, Bible commentary, and discussion of religious views and experiences. Id. at 265 n.2.
46. Id. at 265.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 267. The Court made a distinction between the forum created at the university
and fora such as streets or public parks since the school's forum was not open to students and
nonstudents alike. Thus, while not stating so, the implication is that the university constituted
a limited open forum. Id. at 267 n.5.
49. Id. at 277.
50. Id. at 276. For a discussion of the establishment clause and its requirements see infra
notes 73-134 and accompanying text.
51. 454 U.S. at 276.
52. Several courts which have upheld a school board's denial of student religious groups'
right to meet on public high school facilities have, nonetheless, conceded that the students have
valid first amendment interests to engage in their proposed activity. See, e.g., Bell v. Little Axe
Indep. School Dist., 766 F.2d 1391, 1400-02 (10th Cir. 1985); Bender v. Williamsport Area
School Dist., 741 F.2d 539, 550 (3d Cir. 1984), rev'g 563 F. Supp. 697 (M.D. Pa. 1983), cert.
granted, 469 U.S. 1206, vacated and remanded with instruction to dismiss for want of juris-
diction, 475 U.S. 534 (1986).
53. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I. provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."
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with religious practice. Free exercise includes the right to carry on religious
activities, the right to pray, the right to build churches, and the right to
hold services.54 The free exercise clause protects religious actions as well as
religious beliefs." The Supreme Court, however, has drawn a distinction
between action and belief.5 6 While the freedom of individual belief is abso-
lute, the freedom of individual conduct is not.17 Generally, the government
may not regulate religious conduct unless the conduct poses a substantial
threat to public safety, peace or order.5"
The government's ability to regulate religious beliefs is even more circum-
scribed. Where a state regulation has the unintended effect of burdening
religious beliefs, it will only be upheld if the regulation serves a compelling
state interest and it is the least restrictive means of achieving that interest.5 9
Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded in Sherbert,60 that one cannot
be forced to forsake or alter religious beliefs in order to secure a state
benefit. 6' In Sherbert, a Seventh Day Adventist was fired for refusing to
work on Saturdays, her religion's day of rest. 62 The Court held that the state
had violated her right to free exercise of religion by refusing to give her
unemployment compensation. 63 The Court reasoned that the state's interest
in preventing fraudulent claims by claimants feigning religious objection to
Saturday work was not sufficiently compelling to justify an impingement on
the free exercise of religion."
54. Note, The Equal Access Act: The Establishment Clause v. The Free Exercise and Free
Speech Clauses, 33 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 447, 457 (1988).
55. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 699 (1986); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-03
(1963); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
56. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166 ("Laws are made for the government of actions and while
they cannot interfere with mere religious beliefs and opinions, they may with practices.").
57. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 699.
58. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403 (citing Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946); Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); Reynolds
v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878)).
59. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406-07. See also Smith, Constitutional Rights of Students, Their
Families, and Teachers in the Public Schools, 10 CAMPBELL L. REV. 353, 375-79 (1988)
(concluding that "students and their families whose religious beliefs are subject to impairment
in the public schools are entitled by the free exercise clause to some form of relief").
60. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
61. Id. at 410.
62. Id. at 399. The Seventh-day Adventist was unable to find other work because of her
religious objection to Saturday work. The State Unemployment Commission denied her appli-
cation for unemployment compensation based on the South Carolina Unemployment Compen-
sation Act which states that a claimant is ineligible for benefits if he has failed, without good
cause, to accept available suitable work. Id. at 400-01.
63. Id. at 403.
64. Id. at 407. The Court felt that even if the threat of false claims were a legitimate
concern, the state would have the burden of showing that there were not alternative means to
combat such abuses. Id.
The Supreme Court extended free exercise rights to the families of public high school students
in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). In Yoder, an Amish family declined to send its
12891990]
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The standard presently applied in free exercise cases, is derived from
Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division. 61
In Thomas, the petitioner was denied unemployment compensation after
refusing to work. The petitioner, a Jehovah's Witness, terminated his em-
ployment after being transferred to a department that produced weapons. 6
The Court, following Sherbert, granted the petitioner the right to collect
unemployment compensation. 67 The Court stated that in order to prove a
violation of free exercise rights, the claimant must show one of two things:
(1) that the state has conditioned receipt of an important benefit upon
conduct proscribed by a religious faith; or (2) that the state has denied such
a benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief. 6 In light of these
cases, student religious groups which have been denied access to public high
schools have argued that they were being denied the benefit of meeting at
the school, a benefit granted to other groups, based on the group's religious
beliefs.69
The case law indicates that the Supreme Court has granted both free
speech and free exercise rights to public high school students. Although the
Court has declared that the first amendment rights of students are not co-
extensive with the rights of adults in other settings,70 the state, nevertheless,
cannot restrict the fiee speech rights of students absent an interest in main-
children to public or private school beyond eighth grade for fear that sending the children to
school would expose the family to censure by the church and endanger the salvation of the
entire family. The Court exempted the Amish children from the state compulsory education
laws on the grounds that the religious rights of Amish families outweigh the state's interest in
preparing children for effective participation in the political system and preparing the children
for self-sufficiency in society. Id. at 222. While the Yoder Court failed to specifically state that
high school students possess free exercise rights, that conclusion can certainly be implied from
the case. The dissent in Yoder attacks the Court's failure to specifically address the constitutional
rights of the children involved. Id. at 241-46 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part). Justice Douglas
argues that "religion is an individual experience" and, therefore, the views of the child are
critical in this case. Id. at 243. He supports his argument by citing several Supreme Court cases
which hold that children have constitutionally protected interests. Id. at 243-44. E.g., In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S.
503 (1969); Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
65. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
66. Id. at 709.
67. Id. at 720.
68. Id. at 717-18.
69. See, e.g., Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984), rev'g
563 F. Supp. 697 (M.D. Pa. 1983), cert. granted, 469 U.S. 1206, vacated and remanded with
instruction to dismiss for want of jurisdiction, 475 U.S. 534 (1986) (student group, which
initiated a nondenominational prayer club, argued it should be permitted to meet at school
during a half hour activity period designated as a time for school clubs); Brandon v. Board of
Educ., 635 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1980) (high school students argued they should be permitted to
have communal prayer meetings immediately before the schoolday commenced).
70. Bethel School Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986) (the court declared that while
adults may use an offensive form of expression to make what the speaker considers a political
point, it does not follow that children in a public school must be given the same latitude).
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taining order and discipline. 71 Further, the state must have a compelling
interest in order to restrict the free exercise of religion. 72 Whenever free
speech and free exercise claims are asserted in equal access cases, however,
the courts must balance those claims against the threat of an establishment
clause violation.
C. The Establishment Clause
The establishment clause of the first amendment declares that "Congress
shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion." '73 The purpose
of the establishment clause, as set out by the Founding Fathers, was to
protect against "sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of
the sovereign in religious activity." '74 The Supreme Court, in Lemon v.
Kurtzman,71 established the modern test for evaluating whether a particular
statute or government policy violates the establishment clause. The three-
prong test requires: (1) that the government policy has a secular purpose;
(2) that the policy has the primary effect of neither advancing nor inhibiting
religion; and (3) that it does not foster an excessive entanglement between
government and religion. 76 If all three of these prongs are satisfied, there is
71. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (there
was neither an interruption of school activities nor an intrusion into school affairs caused by
students wearing black armbands to show disapproval of the Vietnam hostilities). Cf. Widmar
v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276-77 (1981) (state must have a compelling interest to restrict the
free speech rights of university students).
72. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 719 (1981) (employer could not show compelling
interest sufficient to justify the burden on employee's religious liberty that resulted from forcing
employee to participate in the production of military weapons in contravention of his religious
beliefs); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) (state intrusion in universal education
not compelling enough to justify compulsory education in contravention of the Amish religion);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406-07 (1963) (no compelling state interest to justify mandating
that employee work Saturdays when such practice violated employee's religious beliefs).
73. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
74. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 672 (1970) (tax exemptions to religious organizations
for properties used solely for religious worship did not violate establishment clause since they
were not aimed at establishing, sponsoring or supporting religion).
75. 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (striking down Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes that au-
thorized the state to reimburse nonpublic schools for their secular expenses for teacher's salaries,
textbooks, and instruction materials).
76. Id. at 612-13. The three-prong test in Lemon was not an original creation by the Lemon
Court but was, instead, a culmination of several establishment clause decisions which preceded
it. While several cases had an impact on the Lemon decision, the immediate source for the
prongs themselves can be found in two Supreme Court decisions. The source for the first two
prongs of the test is the Court's decision in Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203
(1963). In Abington, the Court struck down a Pennsylvania statute which required public school
teachers to read the Bible at the beginning of each school day while excluding some children
upon the request of their parents. Id. In striking down the law, the Court stated that "to
withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose
and a primary effect which neither advances nor inhibits religion." Id. at 222. The third and
final prong of the Lemon test was taken from the Court's holding in Walz v. Tax Comm'n,
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no establishment clause violation. A violation of any one of the three prongs,
however, is sufficient to constitute an establishment clause violation. 77
1. Secular Purpose
The inquiry under this prong focuses on whether the government policy
in question has a secular purpose. 78 Decisions based on the secular purpose
prong have been inconsistent. A municipality's display of a nativity scene
has been held to have a valid secular purpose. 79 The Supreme Court stated
that the nativity scene served the secular purpose of celebrating the Christmas
Holiday and depicting the origins of the Holiday.80 Four Justices, however,
dissented stating that the nativity scene promotes religion and is not denom-
inationally neutral.8
Similarly, in Marsh v. Chambers,12 the Court upheld the practice of
opening each daily session of a legislature with a prayer by a state paid
chaplain.83 The Court reasoned that the practice is "deeply embedded in the
history and tradition" of the United States and was, therefore, permissible. 4
397 U.S. 664 (1970). In Walz, the Court upheld New York City's practice of exempting religious
organizations from taxes on religious properties used solely for religious worship. Id. The Court
stated that this practice would prevent active entanglement between government and religion
that would result if the state attempted to eliminate the exemption. Id. at 674.
77. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
78. Id.
79. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
80. Id. at 681 (Burger, C.J., White, Powell, Rehnquist, and O'Connor, J.J., joined in the
majority opinion).
81. Id. at 700-01 (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, J.J., dissenting). Justice
Brennan, who authored the dissent, argues that the city could have accomplished its proposed
secular objectives just as readily with the display of Santa Claus, reindeer and wishing wells.
Id. at 699. Justice Brennan argues that the city understood the inclusion of the nativity scene
to serve a wholly secular purpose. He cites the Mayor's statement that to eliminate the nativity
scene would be "a step towards establishing another religion, non-religion that it may be." Id.
at 700.
The Supreme Court most recently had occasion to examine the constitutionality of certain
religious Christmas displays in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989). There,
the Court upheld the display of a menorah while striking down the display of a creche. The
decision was very fact-specific and turned on the context within which the religious symbols
were displayed. The thrust of the opinion focused on the second prong of the Lemon test
rather than examining the secular purpose. The Court held that the context within which the
creche was displayed would give the reasonable viewer the impression that the government is
endorsing religion thus violating the establishment clause, while the menorah was displayed
among several secular symbols thus not endorsing religion. Id. See The Supreme Court-
Leading Cases, 103 HARv. L. REv. 137, 228-39 (1989) (discussion and criticism of the Allegheny
decision).
82. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
83. Id. at 786.
84, Id. The Court did not examine the Nebraska legislature's practice under the traditional
Lemon test analysis. Instead, it appears the Court carved out an exception to the Lemon test
based on history and tradition. Id. at 796 (Brennan and Marshall, J.J., dissenting).
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Conversely, a statute requiring balanced treatment in the teaching of
creationism and evolution has no secular purpose despite the state legisla-
ture's express statement that the statute served the secular purpose of "pro-
tecting academic freedom." 5 The Supreme Court in Edwards v. Aguillard,
after examining the legislative history, concluded that the primary purpose
of the statute was to endorse a particular religious doctrine and that the
proposed secular purpose was not advanced by the statute.16
Likewise, in Stone v. Graham,7 the Court held that the posting of the
Ten Commandments, purchased with private funds in public school class-
rooms, has no secular purpose." In Stone, the legislature required the
following notation after the Ten Commandments on the text of each posted
page: "The secular application of the Ten Commandments is clearly seen in
its adoption as the fundamental legal code of Western Civilization and the
Common Law of the United States." 9 The Court concluded that the legis-
lature's proposed secular purpose was insufficient to outweigh the fact that
the purpose here was plainly religious in nature. 90
A further example of a nonsecular purpose appears in Wallace v. Jaffree,91
where the Court struck down an Alabama statute authorizing a one minute
period of silence in public schools "for meditation or voluntary prayer. '92
The Court looked to the legislative history of the statute and, specifically,
to the statement of the bill's sponsor, Senator Donald Holmes, who stated
that the legislation was an "effort to return voluntary prayer" to the public
schools. 93 The Court concluded that the statute was not motivated by any
clearly secular purpose and, as a result, it violated the first prong of the
Lemon test. 91
It is unclear exactly what the standard is regarding violations of the secular
purpose prong. The Court may strike down a statute for lack of secular
purpose based on the legislative history, as in Edwards and Jaffree, or it
may uphold a policy despite a largely religious purpose, as in Lynch. Much
has been written by Justices and commentators considering the adequacy of
the secular purpose prong and the effects it has on the consistency of
establishment clause decisions. 95 Justice O'Connor has proposed a modifi-
85. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586 (1987).
86. Id. at 593.
87. 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam).
88. Id. at 42-43.
89. Id. at 41.
90. Id. (stating that the court would not be "blinded" by legislative recitation of a supposed
secular purpose).
91. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
92. Id.
93. Id. at 57 n.43.
94. Id.
95. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-40 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lynch
v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 691 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also Valauri, The
Concept of Neutrality in Establishment Clause Doctrine, 48 U. PiTT. L. Rav. 83, 133-34 (1986)
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cation of the secular purpose prong which would ask whether the government
intends the statute to convey a message of endorsement of religion or
disapproval of religion, rather than merely requiring a secular purpose.6
Justice Scalia has proposed eliminating the first prong entirely because of
the inconsistent decisions produced by the Court based on the secular purpose
prong. 97 In his dissent in Edwards,9 joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justice Scalia argues that the secular purpose test requires an inquiry into
the "subjective motivation of those enacting the statute. ' 99 According to
Justice Scalia, determining subjective motivation is "almost always an im-
possible task."' ' He argues that legislative histories, post-enactment testi-
mony from legislators and postenactment floor statements are all manipulable
and, therefore, there is no dependable source for determining the subjective
intent of legislators. 101 He concludes that it is time for the Court to sacrifice
the "flexibility" provided by the Lemon test in exchange for "clarity and
predictability." 102 Abandoning the secular purpose prong, Justice Scalia
argues, "would be a good place to start."'' 0 3
Despite the controversy surrounding the secular purpose prong, courts
have consistently held that equal access policies have a secular purpose. 1'°
(arguing that the secular purpose prong prohibits the government from taking affirmative action
to protect the free exercise of religion since that would be construed as state action with a
religious purpose); Comment, The Lemon Test and Subjective Intent in Establishment Clause
Analysis: The Case for Abandoning the Purpose Prong, 76 Ky. L.J. 1061 (1988) (arguing for
the abandonment of the purpose prong because it requires inquiries into subjective intent,
therefore, producing inconsistent decisionmaking and pointing out that the Supreme Court has
refused to look into legislative intent in other contexts) [hereinafter Comment, The Lemon
test]; Comment, Lemon Reconstituted: Justice O'Connor's Proposed Modifications of the
Lemon Test for Establishment Clause Violations, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REv. 465 (concluding that
Justice O'Connor's modification of the purpose prong improves the Lemon test by invalidating
a policy with any improper purpose and by demanding that a government policy not convey a
message of endorsement of religion); Note, Wallace v. Jaffree: The Lemon Test Sweetened, 22
Hous. L. REV. 1273 (1985) (discussing the proposed refinement of the Lemon test as suggested
by Justice O'Connor); Note, The Lemon Test Soured: The Supreme Court's New Establishment
Clause Analysis, 37 VAND. L. RaV. 1175 (1984) (analyzing the threat posed to the Lemon test
by the Marsh and Lynch decisions both of which ruled on a historical recognition of religion
in society as a justification for establishment clause encroachments).
96. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 691 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
97. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (the secular
purpose prong "exacerbates the tension between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses,
has no basis in the language or history of the Amendment, and . . . has wonderfully flexible
consequences").
98. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
99. Id. at 636 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 638.
102. Id. at 640.
103, Edwards, 482 U.S. at 640.
104. Courts generally concede that an equal access policy has the secular purpose of providing
a forum for the free exchange of ideas. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271 (1981)
(stating that an equal access policy is not necessarily incompatible with the court's establishment
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Although the Court has only rarely struck down a policy for lack of a
secular purpose, 05 the general rule remains that a government policy or
statute must have a secular purpose and the chief motivating force behind
it cannot be religious, in order for the policy to satisfy the secular purpose
prong.
2. Primary Effect
Under the second prong of the Lemon test, the policy in question must
have the effect of neither advancing nor inhibiting religion.: ° In Grand
Rapids School District v. Ball,0 7 for example, the Court struck down a
shared time program under which teachers, hired by the public school system,
taught classes to nonpublic school students. The classes were taught in
classrooms leased from nonpublic schools, the financing for which came
from the public school system.'08 The Court concluded that the program
would impermissibly advance religion in three ways."° First, the teachers
may intentionally or inadvertently inculcate particular religious beliefs. 1'0
Second, the "symbolic union of church and state" may convey the image
clause cases); Mergens v. Board of Educ., 867 F.2d 1076, 1079 (8th Cir. 1989) (extending the
appropriateness of the equal access principle to public secondary school students), cert. granted,
109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989).
Even courts which have struck down equal access policies as violative of the establishment
clause conceded that the policy has a secular purpose. See, e.g., Garnett v. Renton School
Dist., 865 F.2d 1121, 1124 (9th Cir. 1989) (court recognized the arguably secular purpose
involved in allowing equal access to school facilities), modified, 874 F.2d 608 (9th Cir. 1989);
Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538, 551 (3d Cir. 1984) (student initiated
nondenominational prayer club argued it should be permitted to meet at school during a half
hour activity period designated as a time for school clubs to conduct meetings), rev'g 563 F.
Supp. 697 (M.D. Pa. 1983), cert. granted, 469 U.S. 1206, vacated and remanded with instruction
to dismiss for want of jurisdiction, 475 U.S. 534 (1986); Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d
971, 978 (2d Cir. 1980) (court stated that equal access policies have the secular purpose of
encouraging extracurricular activities yet ruled that allowing student-initiated voluntary prayer
would violate the establishment clause), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981).
105. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (balanced treatment of creationism
and evolution has no secular purpose); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (Alabama statute
which provided a one minute period of silence for meditation or prayer during classtime in
public schools had no secular purpose); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (posting Ten
Commandments in public school classrooms has no secular purpose); Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 U.S. 97 (1968) (striking down an Arkansas statute which prohibited any teacher in the
schools of the state from teaching that humans evolved from lower forms of life on the basis
that the only reason for the existence of the law is the belief by some that creationism is the
exclusive source of doctrine as to the origin of man).
106. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
107. 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 397.
110. Id.
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of government support of a particular religion to students and the general
public.' Finally, the program may provide a subsidy to the religious mission
of the particular institution affected.' 2
The second of the three religious effects outlined by the Court in Grand
Rapids involves the perceived effect of the policy rather than the actual
effect. Neither an actual nor a perceived effect of advancing religion will be
tolerated. As one court stated, "the mere appearance of secular involvement
in religious activities might indicate that the state has placed its imprimatur
on a particular religious creed. This symbolic inference is too dangerous to
permit."'' 3 Similarly, the inference of state hostility towards religion will
also not be permitted.1' 4
The Widmar Court held that university students are capable of perceiving
a policy of equal access as one which is neutral towards religion, thus
satisfying the primary effect prong. 5 When examining equal access to public
high schools, therefore, the issue is whether the difference between university
and high school students is so great that high school students are not capable
of perceiving equal access as neutral. Most courts have held that high school
students are too impressionable to recognize equal access as a policy of
neutrality.' 6 These courts reason that compulsory education laws make
students a captive audience and that young and impressionable high school
students will perceive the state's action in allowing a religious group to meet
as the state's endorsement of that religious group.
111. Grand Rapids, 473 U.S. at 397.
112. Id.
113. Brandon v. Board of Educ. 635 F.2d 971, 978 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1123 (1981).
In Allegheny v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989), a divided Supreme Court appears to have
adopted the endorsement test. Under the endorsement test, the relevant constitutional inquiry
is whether a reasonable observer would perceive the challenged governmental action as having
the effect of endorsing religion. Id. at 3115.
114. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
115. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 n.14 (1981).
116. See, e.g., Garnett v. Renton School Dist., 865 F.2d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 1989) (high
school students are less mature and more impressionable than college students, and because
high school teachers are authority figures, their involvement has greater impact), modified, 874
F.2d 608 (9th Cir. 1989); Bell v. Little Axe Ind. School Dist., 766 F.2d 1391, 1404-05 (10th
Cir. 1985) (court stated that younger school children are unlikely to distinguish between school
sponsorship and school supervision); Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 539,
551-55 (3d Cir. 1984) (court stated that the students' lack of maturity would make them less
able to appreciate the fact that a decision to allow meetings of a nondenominational prayer
group was made with neutrality towards religion); Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock
Ind. School Dist., 669 F.2d 1039, 1045 (5th Cir. 1982) (court stated that the impressionability
of students coupled with the possibility that they might "misapprehend" the District's involve-
ment in religious organizations caused a violation of the primary effect prong of the Lemon
test), reh'g denied, 680 F.2d 424 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 115 (1983); Brandon
v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 978-79 (2d Cir. 1980) (court stated that impressionable
students, such as those in elementary and secondary schools, may be misled even by the mere
appearance of secular involvement in religious activities).
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In other cases which discuss student maturity and do not involve religion,
however, courts have ruled that students are able to discern between state
and nonstate action.117 There is also much research and data in the area of
adolescent psychology " ' which indicates that high school students possess
sufficient cognitive skills to make them realize "the difference between
'neutral accommodation' and 'indoctrination.""' 9 Thus, while psychologists
feel that high school students are mature enough to recognize a policy of
equal access as one of neutrality and while the courts themselves have
conceded that high school students are able to discern state from nonstate
action, the courts have been unwilling to rule that high school students have
the same cognitive skills when it comes to religious issues.
The third religious effect mentioned in Grand Rapids is another means by
which the second prong of the Lemon test is sometimes violated. This occurs
when a government program provides a subsidy to religion. n Thus, the free
use of tax-financed classrooms, the light and heat used in these rooms, and
the free monitoring by teachers of religious groups might grant a subsidy to
117. See, e.g., Russo v. Central School Dist., 469 F.2d 623, 633 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that
teacher's first amendment rights were violated when she was discharged for standing silently
during the pledge of allegiance and the court noted that high school students "are approaching
an age when they form their own judgments. They readily perceive the existence of conflicts
in the world around them"), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 932 (1973); James v. Board of Educ., 461
F.2d 566, 574 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that teacher could not be dismissed for wearing a black
armband in class to protest the Vietnam War and concluding that "[ilt does not appear ...
to be anything more than a benign symbolic expression of the teacher's personal views"), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972), reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 947 (1973). See also The Equal Access
Act, 16 J.L. & EDuc. 225, 230-33 (1987) (concluding that high school students are capable of
distinguishing between school sponsored and student-initiated activities based on Supreme Court
decisions regarding student maturity).
118. See Note, The Constitutional Dimensions of Student-Initiated Religious Activity in
Public High Schools, 92 Yale L.J. 499, 507-09 (1983) (suggesting that high school students are
"generally independent and capable of critical inquiry") [hereinafter Note, Constitutional
Dimensions]; Note, Religion in Public Schoolrooms-Striking a Balance Between Freedom of
Speech and Establishment of Religion: Bender v. Williamsport Area School District, 1984
B.Y.U. L. REv. 671, 679 (explaining studies conducted in the field of adolescent psychology
regarding the maturity of high school students) [hereinafter Note, Religion in Public School-
rooms]. See also Piaget, The Intellectual Development of the Adolescent, ADOLESCENCE 23
(1969) (Piaget developed a four-stage theory of cognitive and moral development suggesting
that by the fourth stage, typically between the ages of twelve and fifteen, the adolescent is
capable of forming his own ideas, debating and disagreeing with his peers and acting on his
own beliefs as an autonomous individual). See also ERICKSON, IDENTrrTY: YOUTH AND CRIsIs
(1968) (Erickson stresses that adolescence is a stage in which the individual seeks to establish a
new identity. This process of self-identification requires the adolescent to make distinctions
between his views and those of others); Coleman, Friendship and the Peer Group in Adolescence,
HANDBOOK OF ADOLESCENT PSYCHOLOOY 424-25 (1980) (stating that while conformity is prevalent
among early adolescents, by the age of fourteen or fifteen, individuals begin to see the advantages
of independence and conformity decreases rapidly).
119. See Note, Constitutional Dimensions, supra note 118, at 509.
120. Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397 (1985).
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religion in violation of the establishment clause. 121 Providing a subsidy to a
religious organization may also cause excessive entanglement between gov-
ernment and religion, a violation of the third prong of the Lemon test.
3. Excessive Entanglement
Under the third and final prong of the Lemon test, the policy in question
must not foster an excessive entanglement between government and relig-
ion. 122 The inquiry into excessive entanglement focuses on procedural ques-
tions.2 3 Some appellate courts have held that if the government must engage
in continuing supervision of religious activity, church and state become
excessively entangled. 124 Thus, a group which needs supervision or monitoring
by government employees, as most high school groups would require, may
excessively entangle church and state. 121
The government may also become excessively entangled in religion through
the expenditure of public funds as an aid to religion. 26 The issue here is
whether a school monitor and the expenditure of public funds are benefits
which cause an excessive entanglement between government and religion or
whether they are merely incidental benefits which accommodate religion.' 27
The principle of religious accommodation was first articulated by the Su-
preme Court in Zorach v. Clauson. 121 In Zorach, the Court examined a New
121. See Teitel, The Unconstitutionality of Equal Access Policies and Legislation Allowing
Organized Student-Initiated Religious Activities in the Public High Schools: A Proposal for a
Unitary First Amendment Forum Analysis, 12 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 529, 562-65 (1985) (citing
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) and McCollum v. Board of Educ.,
333 U.S. 203, 210 (1948), for the proposition that the use of tax paid premises by a religious
group is an unconstitutional aid to religion).
122. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
123. Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736, 755 (1976).
124. See, e.g., Garnett v. Renton School Dist., 865 F.2d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 1989) (the
district was responsible for safety and discipline of students and the action taken to satisfy this
duty, that is, supervision, would cause excessive entanglement), modified, 814 F.2d 608 (9th
Cir. 1989); Bell v. Little Axe Ind. School Dist., 766 F.2d 1391, 1406-07 (10th Cir. 1985) (policy
requiring school officials to monitor all student meetings in order to scrutinize the content
would create excessive entanglement when enforced upon religious groups); Lubbock Civil
Liberties Union v. Lubbock Ind. School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038, 1047 (5th Cir. 1982) (policy
permitting students to meet before and after school hours for religious purposes created excessive
entanglement because under Texas law all such meetings had to be supervised by school officials);
Brandon v. Board of Educ., 635 F.2d 971, 979 (2d Cir. 1980) (because student prayer sessions
would be taking place during school hours, while school officials were responsible for students'
care, the officials would be forced to monitor the prayer groups' activities causing excessive
entanglement).
125. The Court in Widmar, stated that government is more entangled when it attempts to
enforce its exclusion of "religious worship" and "religious speech" because it must continuously
monitor the speech of students meeting on school facilities to ensure compliance with the rule.
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 272 n.ll (1981).
126. Teitel, supra note 121, at 576-77.
127. For a discussion of the concept of religious accommodation see McConnell, Accom-
modation of Religion, 1985 Sup. CT. REv. 1.
128. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
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York City program which allowed public schools to release students during
the school day so that the students could leave the school building and
attend religious instruction at religious centers. 29 The Court held that,
because there was no expenditure of public funds and no coercing of students
who did not want to attend religious instruction, the city's policy merely
served to accommodate the school day to the spiritual needs of some of the
students. 130
Accommodation has been defined as the following:
An accommodation to religion is a practice undertaken specifically for the
purpose of facilitating the free exercise of religion, usually by 'exempt[ing],
where possible, from generally applicable governmental regulation indivi-
duals whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be
infringed, or [by creating] without state involvement an atmosphere in
which religious exercise may flourish.-3
Under the doctrine of religious accommodation, some state entanglement
with religion is permissible if the policy in question has a secular purpose
and effect.132 The Court has stated that "not every law that confers an
'indirect,' 'remote,' or 'incidental' benefit upon religious institutions is, for
that reason alone, constitutionally invalid." 3  Thus, while some entanglement
may be tolerated, the entanglement cannot be excessive. 3 4
D. Equal Access
1. Pre-EAA Cases
The competing constitutional concerns discussed above have come into
conflict on several occasions when voluntary student religious groups wished
to meet on public school grounds. In 1978, a school board in New York
denied permission to a voluntary student prayer group which desired to
conduct communal prayer meetings in a classroom immediately before the
start of the school day. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Brandon
v. Board of Education,"'3 upheld the school board's denial of permission. 3 6
The court held that the students' free exercise rights were not violated since
129. Id. at 308.
130. Id. at 312-14. But see McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948) (striking down
a policy which allowed students voluntarily to attend religious class on public school premises,
during school hours, taught by privately-employed religious teachers).
131. See McConnell, supra note 127, at 3-4 (citing McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 639
(1978) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
132. Note, Constitutional Dimensions, supra note 118, at 512.
133. Committee for Public Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 771 (1973). See also West,
Constitutional Judgment on Non-Public School Aid: Fresh Guidelines or New Roadblocks? 35
EMORY L.J. 795, 808-14 (1986).
134. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
135. 635 F.2d 971, 978 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981).
136. Id.
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the students had the option of praying elsewhere '37 and that the students'
free speech rights were outweighed by establishment clause concerns. 3 ' Shortly
thereafter, the United States Supreme Court delivered the Widmar opinion 39
granting a student religious group the right to meet on public university
facilities.
Although the Widmar decision made clear that the denial of equal access
to students would not be tolerated on a university campus, the Court did
not provide guidance as to whether its holding would apply to the public
high school setting. This created some confusion in the lower courts. Several
circuit courts continued to deny equal access to student initiated religious
groups in public high schools. 4 The most notable of these cases is Bender
v. Williamsport Area School District.'4 In Bender, a group of students
requested permission to form a voluntary club called "Petros" that would
meet during the activity period at Williamsport Area High School. 42 Wil-
liamsport had already allowed 29 other student clubs to meet on its prem-
ises. 1 43 After the organizational meeting of "Petros" the school no longer
permitted the group.to meet.'" The students brought suit alleging that their
first amendment rights to free speech and free exercise had been violated.'4
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the school board
on the free exercise claim and in favor of the students on the free speech
claim, thus allowing the student group to meet.'" The Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit reversed, holding that: (1) the students had a "valid first
amendment right to engage in their proposed activity;"' 4 7 (2) the Williamsport
Area School District had created a limited open forum; 48 (3) the school
district may object to the presence of Petros as violative of the establishment
clause;' 49 and (4) "the interest in protecting free speech within the context
137. Id. at 977-78.
138. Id. at 979-80.
139. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
140. See, e.g., Bell v. Little Axe Ind. School Dist., 766 F.2d 1391 (10th Cir. 1985); Bender
v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984); Nartowicz v. Clayton County
School Dist., 736 F.2d 646 (1 1th Cir. 1984); Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Ind.
School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982).
141. 741 F.2d 538 (3d Cir. 1984); See Note, Religion in Public Schoolrooms, supra note 118,
at 671 (concluding, after analyzing Bender under the Lemon test and after applying a freedom
of speech v. establishment clause balancing test, that the students' free speech rights should
have outweighed the establishment clause claim).
142. Bender, 741 F.2d at 542.
143. Id. at 543-44.
144. Id. at 543.
145. Id.
146. 563 F. Supp. 697 (M.D. Pa. 1983). The court held that the students had sufficient
alternative means for religious worship, thus their free exercise rights were not impaired. Id.
at 703. However, the district court rejected the school board's claim of an establishment clause
violation and upheld the students' free speech rights. Id. at 715-16.
147. Bender, 741 F.2d at 550.
148. Id. at 550.
149. Id. at 557.
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of the activity period as it exists at Williamsport Area High School is
outweighed by the establishment clause.""15 The court's conclusion meant
that the school could deny equal access. In 1985, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to Bender. '5' However, rather than deciding the case on the merits,
the Court held that the respondent had no standing to appeal, and the court
of appeals had no jurisdiction to hear his appeal. 5 2
Chief Justice Burger, along with Justices White and Rehnquist, dissented
from the Bender opinion and addressed the issue on the merits.'" Their
dissent stressed that the issue in question was about an individual's partici-
pation and advocacy of religion and that this could not be transformed into
state advancement of religion.1 4 Since the state was not leading or partici-
pating in religious discussion, there was no state action. State inaction,
therefore, could not result in an establishment clause violation., Justice
Powell dissented separately, stressing that the Bender decision is controlled
by Widmar'5 6 and that the age difference between high school and college
students does not justify a departure from Widmar.'17
2. The Equal Access Act
In an attempt to clear up the confusion engendered by the equal access
decisions, Congress enacted the Equal Access Act.' Senator Mark Hatfield
sponsored the original congressional equal access proposal in September of
1982.'" The legislative history of the EAA reveals that the one of the purposes
behind the Act is the desire to end widespread religious discrimination against
student religious speech.160 The legislative history and the text of the Act
itself are both dominated by discussions of religion 6' and some have argued
150. Id. at 559.
151. 474 U.S. 1002 (1985).
152. Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534 (1986) (respondent, John C.
Youngman, had no standing to appeal in his individual capacity since he could not invoke the
school board's right to appeal nor could he appeal as a parent, a capacity in which he was not
a party in the district court).
153. Id. at 551 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
154. Id. at 553.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 555.
157. Id.
158. 20 U.S.C. § 4071-74 (Supp. 11 1984). For a discussion of the provisions of the EAA in
a constitutional framework, see generally, Strossen, A Constitutional Analysis of the Equal
Access Act's Standards Governing Public School Student Religious Meetings, 24 HAsv. J. ON
LEGIS. 117 (1987).
159. 128 CONG. REc. 24070 (1982). For a brief history of the EAA and the politics behind
it, see Boisvert, Of Equal Access and Trojan Horses, 3 LAW & INEQUALITY 373, 375-79 (1985).
160. S. REP. No. 357, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, 11 (1984); Laycock, see supra note 27, at
39.
161. Consider the following examples:
"Today we consider an equal access amendment that will permit the name of
God to be uttered once again in our public schools other than profanely." 130
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that the Act was prompted by the failure of Congress to enact a school
prayer amendment or school prayer legislation. 162
The EAA applies to any public secondary school that "receives federal
financial assistance."'' 63 Any school to which the Act applies is prohibited
from "deny[ing] equal access or a fair opportunity to, or discriminat[ing]
against, any students who wish to conduct a meeting ... on the basis of
the religious, philosophical, or other content of the speech at such meetings,"
provided that the school has a "limited open forum" and the students seek
to conduct their meeting within that forum. 6
Thus, the crucial inquiry in any equal access case is whether the high
school in question has created a limited open forum, thereby subjecting it
to the requirements of the Act. Under Supreme Court case law concerning
public fora, the Court has defined a limited public forum as a forum
designated by the government for use by the public at large for assembly
and speech, for use by certain speakers, or for the discussion of certain
subjects.1 6s Once the government has created a limited public forum, only a
compelling state interest can justify the restriction of speech within that
forum.'6
The Act defines "limited open forum" as follows: "A public secondary
school has a limited open forum whenever such school grants an offering
to or opportunity for one or more noncurriculum related student groups to
meet on school premises during noninstructional time." 167 "Noninstructional
time" and "noncurriculum related" are crucial terms for the understanding
of the Act.
"Noninstructional time" is defined in the Act as "time set aside by the
school before actual classroom instruction begins or after actual classroom
instruction ends." 6s The wording of this definition and the legislative history
CONo. REc. S6651 (daily ed. June 6, 1984) (statement of Sen. Denton);
"We knew we couldn't win on school prayer but equal access gets us what we
wanted all along." Id. at H7725 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (statement of Rep.
Schumer) (quoting the Reverend Jerry Falwell).
Note too that many provisions of the Act address only the protection of religious speech.
These provisions serve to shield the Act from attack on establishment clause grounds while the
provisions addressing content-based discriminations against speech in general, that is, religious,
philosophical, political or otherwise, are rather few.
162. "[Tlhe equal access bill [is) known as the son of school prayer.... [TIhis bill looks
like school prayer, it tastes like school prayer and it smells like school prayer." 130 CONG.
REC. H7733 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (statement of Rep. Ackerman).
Other members of Congress expressed their concern that the Act was an attempt to bring
religion back into the public schools through the back door. Id. at S8352 (daily ed. June 27,
1984) (statement of Sen. Metzenbaum). See also Teitel, supra note 121, at 543-49.
163. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a) (Supp. 11 1984).
164. Id.
165. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 n.7 (1983). See
supra notes 20-28 and accompanying text (for a discussion of public fora).
166. Id.
167. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(b) (Supp. 11 1984).
168. Id. § 4072(4).
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of the Act indicate that noninstructional time occurs either before or after
the entire compulsory attendance period and not during lunch breaks or
activity periods, as was the case in Bender. 69
The Act contains no definition of "noncurriculum related student groups."
The legislative history of the Act, however, provides some guidance. It shows
that the definition of "noncurriculum related" was intended to be quite
broad while curriculum related was to be construed quite narrowly. 70 Thus,
unless the student club is essentially an extension of the curriculum and aids
students in learning substantive course material, it will not be deemed
curriculum related.' 7' Where a public high school allows a noncurriculum
related student group the opportunity to meet on its premises during non-
instructional time, it has created a limited open forum and the Equal Access
Act will apply.
Even after the passage of the EAA, however, several courts have continued
to deny equal access to student initiated groups. In Clark v. Dallas Inde-
pendent School District, 72 a district court upheld a school district's policy
of not allowing student groups to meet, before or after school, for religious
purposes . 7  The court conceded that the EAA applied to the facts in that
case, but refused to apply it claiming that its application would lead to an
unconstitutional result. 74 The court stopped short of declaring the Act
unconstitutional, but held that only a constitutional amendment could change
the Fifth Circuit precedent to which it was bound. 75
169. See 130 CoNG. REc. S8353 (daily ed. June 27, 1984).
170. Strossen, supra, note 158, at 162 (citing 130 CONG. REc. H7732 (daily ed. July 25,
1984) (statement of Rep. Goodling); 130 CONG. Rac. H7726 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (statement
of Rep. Roukema); 130 CONG. REc. S8342 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Hatfield)).
171. The Supreme Court had occasion to discuss curriculum relatedness in Hazelwood School
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988). There the Court held that a public high school could
censor two pages of a student newspaper which was produced as part of a journalism class
and described three of the high school students' experiences with pregnancy. The Court reasoned
that the newspaper was not a public forum since it was closely tied to the curriculum, that is,
the journalism class, and that the school, as publisher, could edit for grammatical mistakes,
poor grammar, vulgar or profane speech, or for speech unsuitable for immature audiences. Id.
at 268-70. Thus, the Supreme Court's interpretation of curriculum-relatedness seems to be
somewhat in accordance with the legislative history of the EAA. Both conclude that if an
activity is an extension of the classwork or a product of the class, that activity is curriculum
related.
172. 671 F. Supp. 1119 (N.D. Tex. 1987).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 1124.
175. Id. The Fifth Circuit had decided in Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Ind.
School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038 (5th Cir. 1982), that religious meetings, either before or after
regular school hours, were violative of the establishment clause.
The Clark court later granted a motion to amend the decision and limited its holding only
to loud and disruptive meetings of the student group. The court again stated that it would not
apply the EAA and expressly stated that it would not express any view on the constitutionality
of the Act. Id.
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In Garnett v. Renton School District,'76 the Ninth Circuit avoided applying
the EAA by holding that the school had not created a limited open forum
as defined by the Act.' The court held that all clubs meeting at the high
school in question were curriculum related since they "are all supervised by
faculty advisers and are so closely related to course work or are so integral
a part of the traditional and official school programs that they cannot
reasonably be termed 'noncurriculum related.""" In Garnett, the school had
already allowed several student groups to meet on its facilities including the
Chess Club, the Bowling Club and the Special Kiwanis Youth Club. 1 9 The
court accepted the school board's argument that the Chess Club is an
extension of the math program, the Bowling Club is an extension of the
physical education program and the Special Kiwanis Club meets the school
board's educational goal of fostering communicative skills.1' °
Despite Congress's attempt to insure that religious groups would be granted
equal access, however, some religious groups have still been denied access
to public high schools.'8 ' The first appellate court decision to uphold the
EAA was the Eighth Circuit's decision in Mergens v. Board of Education.'2
II. THE MERoENS CASE
A. Facts and Procedure
A group of students at Westside High School ("WHS") in Omaha,
Nebraska, wished to form a Christian Bible Study Club which would meet
after school on school grounds.'83 WHS is part of the Westside Community
School System and is controlled by the Board of Education of Westside
Community Schools.1 4 WHS is a public secondary school which receives
federal funds.8 5 The school allows thirty different groups to meet on school
grounds on a strictly voluntary basis.8 6 Until the appellants attempted to
176. 865 F.2d 1121 (9th Cir. 1989).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 1127 (citing Garnett, 675 F. Supp. 1268, 1274 (W.D. Wash. 1987)).
179. Garnett v. Renton School Dist., 675 F. Supp. 1268, 1271 (W.D. Wash. 1987).
180. Id. (accepting the district court's findings on the issue of the curriculum relatedness of
each group at the high school).
181. See also Thompson v. Waynesboro Area School Dist., 673 F. Supp. 1379 (M.D. Pa.
1987) (distribution of religious newspapers is not a meeting within the definition of the Act,
and therefore the Act does not apply); Perumal v. Saddleback Valley Unified School Dist., 198
Cal. App. 3d 64, 243 Cal. Rptr. 545 (1988) (the EAA did not. apply where a religious club
sought to advertise in the school yearbook since the school had not adopted a limited open
forum and since the yearbook announcements were not "meetings" within the meaning of the
Act).
182. 867 F.2d 1076 (8th Cir. 1989).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 1077.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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form their club at Westside, no club had ever been denied access to the
school.' 7 Among the groups allowed to meet at WHS are the Chess Club,
Interact, 8' Subsurfers, s9 Zonta,'19 the Student Advisory Board, and Student
Forum. 191
The district court held that the Christian Bible Study Club meetings would
violate the establishment clause of the first amendment. 92 Specifically, the
court held that the EAA did not apply since WHS had not created a limited
open forum. 93 Because there was no limited open forum, the high school
could impose restrictions on the speech of students which were "reasonably
related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.' '1 94 The Eighth Circuit reversed
the decision of the district court and held that the EAA applied to the facts
of the case and that the EAA was constitutional. 9
B. The Court's Opinion
In the first part of the decision, the Eighth Circuit court examined whether
WHS had created a limited open forum thereby triggering the application
of the Act.1'9 The appellants argued that several of the student clubs already
meeting at WHS were noncurriculum related. 97 The high school countered
that all of its student groups, including the Chess Club, Interact and Sub-
surfers, were somehow related to the curriculum. 98 The school board in
Garnett, as noted above, asserted this argument claiming that all of its clubs
are closely related to course work and that they cannot reasonably be termed
"noncurriculum related."199 While the Garnett court accepted this argument,
the Mergens court refused to do so. The court stated that such a broad
interpretation of curriculum-related would render the EAA meaningless. 200
187. Mergens, 867 F.2d at 1077. WHS had no written policy regarding the formation of
clubs. Students wishing to form a club present their goals and objectives to a school official
who determines whether the club is consistent with Board Policy 5610. Board Policy 5610
recognizes student clubs as a "vital part of the total education program as a means of developing
citizenship, wholesome attitudes, good human relations, knowledge and skills." Id.
188. A service club peripherally connected to Rotary International. Id. at 1078.
189. A club for students and community members interested in scuba diving. Id.
190. The female counterpart to Interact. Id.
191. See Mergens v. Board of Educ., No. 85-0-426, slip op. at 11 (D. Neb. filed Feb. 2,
1988). Appellants listed ten clubs meeting at Westside which they contended were noncurriculum
related. In addition to the six mentioned, appellants claim that The National Honor Society,
Photography, Welcome to Westside, and Future Business Leaders of America are also noncur-
riculum related. Id.
192. Id. slip op. at 2.
193. Id.
194. Id. slip op. at 14 (citing Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273
(1988)).
195. Mergens, 867 F.2d 1076.
196. Id. at 1078.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Garnett v. Renton School Dist., 675 F. Supp. 1268, 1274 (W.D. Wash. 1987).
200. Mergens, 867 F.2d at 1078.
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The court reasoned that "[a) school's administration could simply declare
that it maintains a closed forum and choose which student clubs it wanted
to allow by tying the purposes of those student clubs to some broadly defined
educational goal. ' 20 ' The court then concluded that WHS maintains a limited
open forum and that the EAA forbids discrimination against the students'
proposed club on the basis of its religious content. 20 2
Further, the court analyzed the constitutionality of the EAA. 20 3 The court
applied the three part Lemon test and held that each prong was satisfied.
Therefore, there was no establishment clause violation. 204
Under the secular purpose prong of the Lemon test, the court concluded
that the EAA has the secular purpose of providing a forum for the exchange
of ideas between students. 20 5 On the issue of whether the EAA has the
primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, the court held that any
benefits to religion would be merely incidental. 201 The court refuted the
argument that high school students are more impressionable than university
students and extended Widmar to the high school setting. 2°7 The court did
not agree that high school students were so immature and impressionable
that they could not distinguish an equal access policy as one of neutrality. 208
Instead, the court deferred to the legislative findings on the maturity of high
school students. 209 Finally, on the issue of entanglement, the court held that
any entanglement between church and state would not be excessive.21 0 The
court, again citing Widmar, declared that a policy of religious censorship is
more likely to cause entanglement than an equal access policy since a policy
of religious censorship would require the university to constantly monitor
the meetings of registered student groups.2 1'
The court ultimately stated that the EAA is a codification of the Supreme
Court's Widmar decision. 12 Consequently, any constitutional attack on the
Act must be premised on the difference between secondary school students
and university students, a difference which the Mergens court refused to
recognize. 2 3 The Mergens court went as far as to say that its decision would
have been the same under Widmar alone.21 4
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1079.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 1079-80.
205. Mergens, 867 F.2d at 1079 (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271 n.10 (1981)).
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1080.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Mergens, 867 F.2d at 1079.
211. Id. at 1079-80 (citing Widmar, 454 U.S. at 272 n.11).
212. Id. at 1079.
213. Id. at 1080.
214. Id.
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III. ANALYSIS
The Mergens court opinion goes against the weight of authority regarding
equal access to public secondary schools. It is the first appellate court decision
to apply and uphold the requirements of the EAA in a case regarding a
student-initiated religious group in a public high school. Rather than applying
the traditional free exercise/free speech vs. establishment clause balancing
test, the court reached its decision by first analyzing whether the EAA applies
and then examining the constitutionality of the Act. 215 The court apparently
determined that Congress had already considered the free exercise/free speech
vs. establishment clause balancing test involved in situations where a student
religious group wishes to meet on public high school facilities. The Act
assumes that if the high school maintains a limited open forum, the balancing
test is satisfied and the students should be allowed to meet. Thus, if the
EAA applies, there is no need to go through the balancing test for each
individual school. The court's task was to determine the applicability and
constitutionality of the Act.
A. Applicability of the Act
In determining whether or not WHS maintained a limited open forum,
the Mergens court refused to let the school board have the final discretion
as to whether or not a particular student group was curriculum related. This
is a much sounder analysis than the Garnett court approach, which accepted
the school board's argument that none of its student clubs were noncurri-
culum related despite the fact that the Chess Club and the Special Youth
Kiwanis Club both met at the high school in Garnett.21 6 As stated by the
Mergens court, the Garnett court approach would allow public high schools
to discriminate at will against student groups which they do not desire to
have on their premises.217 A circular argument is created by high schools
which argue that they maintain a closed forum but allow several groups
which are arguably not curriculum related to meet on school facilities. They
"permit a student activity to meet if it is curriculum related, and an activity
is curriculum related if they permit it to meet.''218 The Mergens decision
eliminates this type of circular argument.
Whether or not a student group is curriculum related must be determined
by analyzing the school's actions and examining the groups that are already
215. Id. at 1078-79.
216. Garnett v. Renton School Dist., 865 F.2d 1121, 1127 (9th Cir. 1989) (agreeing with the
factual findings of the district court that all the activities allowed to meet at the high school
are "closely related to course work" and "cannot reasonably be termed 'noncurriculum
related').
217. Mergens, 867 F.2d at 1078-79 ("Congress did not intend for the EAA to be easily
circumvented by administrative decree").
218. Hentoff, Teaching Kids a Bad Lesson About Justice, L.A. Daily J., Apr. 20, 1989, at
6, col. 3 (citing Attorney for Mergens brief for the Eighth Circuit, Mergens v. Board of Educ.,
867 F.2d 1076 (8th Cir. 1989)).
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allowed to meet on school premises. The determination of whether a school
has created a limited open forum must be based on what the school does
and not on what it says it does. 21 9 If a school board accepts the argument
that a chess club fosters logic and critical thinking and is, therefore, related
to the math curriculum, it can then accept similar arguments about other
clubs. Perhaps the Republican Club is directly related to a course in gov-
ernment. Perhaps the Existentialist Club is directly related to French courses
which cover twentieth century French literature. And perhaps a student
chapter of the Ku Klux Klan is directly related to an American history
course. One can dream up a multitude of absurd justifications for how an
organization ties in with the school curriculum and, according to the Garnett
court's approach, if the school board says it is curriculum related then it is
curriculum related. It is clear that leaving the final discretion to the school
leaves the requirements of the Act open to abuse and, as stated by the
Mergens court, renders the Act meaningless. The school board's policy
concerning student activities should, without question, be given some def-
erence. However, when a content-based discrimination has occurred, the
courts must ultimately decide whether a school has created a limited open
forum. The Mergens court's conclusion that the Chess Club, Zonta, and
other clubs at WHS are noncurriculum related, therefore triggering the
applications of the EAA, comports with the language of the EAA and
Congress's intended meaning of curriculum related.
B. Constitutionality of the Equal Access Act
After determining that the Act applied to the facts of this case, the court
properly concluded that the EAA is constitutional. 2 0 However, while the
EAA is constitutional, under the traditional application of the three-prong
Lemon test, it fails the secular purpose prong. The fact that the EAA is
neutral on its face and neutral in effect while still failing under the traditional
Lemon test approach, indicates a need for an altering and restructuring of
the Lemon test.
1. Secular Purpose
While equal access policies, in general, have a primarily secular purpose,2 2 1
the motivational factor behind the passage of the EAA is dominated by the
219. This may appear inconsistent with the following exchange from the legislative history
cited by the Garnett court: "Mr. Gorton: Would the school district have the full authority to
determine where the line is to be drawn between curriculum-related activities and noncurriculum
related? Mr. Hatfield: We in no way seek to limit that discretion." Garnett v. Renton School
Dist., 675 F. Supp. 1268, 1272-73 (W.D. Wash. 1987) (citing 130 CONo. REc. S8342 (daily ed.,
June 27, 1984)). But see Laycock, supra note 27, at 39 ("It is hard to know what courts should
or will do with all this-[referring to the legislative history). Hatfield can be quoted to prove
anything, which means he proves nothing.").
220. Mergens, 867 F.2d at 1079-80.
221. As noted supra note 104, courts have consistently held that equal access policies have
the secular purpose of providing a forum for the free exchange of ideas and to contribute to
the intellectual, physical or social development of students.
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goal of advancing religion.222 An examination of the legislative history and
the actual wording of the Act reveals that religion dominated this legislation
from start to finish. 223 The primary purpose of the Act was to "permit the
name of God to be uttered again in our public schools ' 2 4 and it was initiated
by the defeat of school prayer legislation. 22 Proponents of the Act claim
that the purpose of the Act is to end discrimination against student groups
based on the content of the groups' speech. 226 However, the legislative history
of the EAA reveals that some supporters of the Act believed that the EAA
would still allow high schools to discriminate against groups like the Ku
Klux Klan or the Nazis. 2 7 Thus, the supporters aim to allow religious groups
to meet but to discriminate against groups with controversial views. Simply
stated, they want to let religious groups in while keeping other select groups
out.
It is relatively clear that, under traditional analysis, the EAA does not
pass muster under the secular purpose prong of the Lemon test. This,
however, should not be sufficient to strike down legislation that is neutral
on its face and neutral in effect. The first prong of the Lemon test should
not be dispositive of an establishment clause violation since it requires courts
to determine the subjective intent of legislators. Legislative intent should not
determine the constitutionality of a statute. 22 What if fifty percent of the
legislators are found to have had a nonsecular purpose? Would that be
sufficient grounds to strike down legislation for lack of secular purpose?
This type of inquiry can never provide consistent decisionmaking.
Justice O'Connor's proposed modification to the Lemon test,2 9 which
would ask whether the government intends the statute to convey a message
of endorsement or disapproval of religion, more clearly defines the inquiry
under this prong. This approach, however, would still require a court to
inquire into the subjective intent behind the statute and this would result in
inconsistent decisionmaking. 2 0
Perhaps the best approach, as proposed by Justice Scalia, 23' would be to
eliminate the first prong entirely and leave the remaining two prongs intact
222. See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text.
223. See Teitel, supra note 121, at 556-59.
224. 130 CoNo. REc. S6651 (daily ed. June 6, 1984) (statement of Sen. Denton).
225. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
226. S. REP. No. 357, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, 11 (1984).
227. See 130 CONG. REC. S8363 (daily ed. June 27, 1984) (statement of Sen. Mitchell); 130
CONG. Rc. H7732 (daily ed. July 25, 1984) (statement of Rep. Goodling).
228. Laycock, supra note 27, at 22-23 ("If secular and religious speech really do get equal
access, it does not matter what motivated Congress"). Laycock cites several cases in which bad
motive was held not to invalidate an otherwise permissible statute. See, e.g., Palmer v.
Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968);
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941).
229. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
230. See Comment, The Lemon Test supra note 95, at 1061.
231. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-40 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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as the test for establishment clause violations. Establishment clause analysis
should focus on whether the state actually sponsors, financially supports or
becomes actively involved in religious activity. 32 The effects of the actions
of the state, and the message that those actions actually convey, should be
determinative of whether the state is endorsing or disapproving of religion,
not the subjective motivation of the legislators. While the EAA was wrong
to dismiss the secular purpose issue by holding that the EAA has a secular
purpose, its analysis with regard to the remaining two prongs was more
sound.
2. Primary Effect
The Mergens court's conclusion that there would be no effect of advancing
or inhibiting religion2 33 is the primary place where its decision deviates from
case precedent on equal access to public high schools. Appellate courts have
consistently held that the impressionability of high school students and
compulsory attendance laws which make students a "captive" audience will
give students the impression that the state is placing its impritiatur on
religion if it allows a religious group to meet on its premises.23 4 The im-
pressionability and captive audience arguments are both without merit.
Several decisions, in nonreligious cases involving high school students,
have held that students of high school age are able to distinguish student
speech from speech endorsed by the school. 2" "In cases involving political,
social, and moral issues, the courts, following the principles laid down in
Tinker, have denied local school boards the authority to censor or control
the student body's exposure to ideas that the school board does not sup-
port. ' 23 6 If students are mature enough not to impute nonreligious speech
to the school board, it follows that the same is true when religious speech
is involved. Furthermore, several studies on adolescent psychology have
shown that high school students are independent and capable of critical
inquiry. 237 Thus, the immaturity and impressionability arguments are not
sufficient to raise establishment clause concerns. High school students are
capable of thinking on their own even when it comes to religious issues.
Equal Access opponents further argue that, unlike the university setting,
compulsory attendance laws for high schools make students a captive audi-
ence and, because of this, students will somehow have religious dogma
forcibly thrust upon them. 238 The argument that compulsory attendance laws
232. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
233. Mergens v. Board of Educ., 867 F.2d 1076, 1079 (8th Cir. 1989).
234. See supra note 116.
235. See supra note 117.
236. Note, Constitutional Dimensions, supra note 118, at 505-06.
237. See sources cited supra note 118.
238. See Teitel, supra note 121, at 562-68. Courts which have struck down equal access
policies have also argued that compulsory attendance laws add to the primary effect of advancing
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make students a captive audience is not applicable where the EAA is con-
cerned. The Act applies only to meetings which take place during nonin-
structional time, which is before or after the compulsory attendance period.2
39
During this time, students are no longer a "captive audience." They are free
to come to school just before class begins and leave immediately after the
school day ends. Therefore, any exposure to a student-initiated religious
group would be completely voluntary.
Thus, the Mergens court properly held that the difference between college
and high school students and the difference between the two educational
settings is not sufficient to support the conclusion that meetings of student
initiated religious groups would violate the second prong of the Lemon
test.
240
3. Excessive Entanglement
Finally, the court correctly concluded that any entanglement between
government and religion would not be excessive. 241 The court's argument
that a policy of religious censorship is more likely to cause entanglement is
rather tenuous. Certainly, under that logic, the argument could then be made
that any nonpublic forum excessively entangles government with religion
since the government would have to constantly monitor the speech in non-
public forums and censor any religious speech therein. Thus, a prison's
nonpublic forum, for example, would violate the establishment clause since
the government would become excessively entangled by having to make sure
that prisoners do not form religious groups.
However, even when the government opens a forum for speech and
provides equal access to that forum, it is clear that any entanglement between
government and religion would be de minimis at best and certainly not
excessive. Entanglement can be engendered by a need for government su-
pervision of the student activity or by expenditure of public funds in support
of the activity. 242
Although most schools require that a teacher be present at student meet-
ings, this requirement does not excessively entangle government with religion.
In general, monitors attend meetings in a nonparticipatory capacity and are
there to insure order and discipline. Because these monitors are granted to
other student groups, religious groups should not be denied this benefit on
the basis of the content of their speech. Perhaps there is some entanglement
when a government employee monitors the meeting of a student religious
religion. See, e.g., Garnett v. Renton School Dist., 865 F.2d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 1989); Bender
v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538, 553 (3d Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds,
475 U.S. 534 (1986); Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d
1038, 1046 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1155 (1983).
239. 20 U.S.C. § 4072(4) (Supp. 11 1984).
240. Mergens v. Board of Educ., 867 F.2d 1076, 1079 (8th Cir. 1989).
241. Id.
242. See supra notes 122-34 and accompanying text (discussion of entanglement).
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group. Religious entanglement, however, is permissible when it has the effect
of accommodating, and not endorsing religion.2 43 Here, because the monitor
is required by the school and is merely a passive attendant, entanglement is
certainly not excessive. The student group in Mergens did not request a
monitor nor, presumably, does it want one unless the school requires one.
The student religious group should not suffer because of a benefit that it
does not want to begin with and which is forced upon them by the school.
The use of public funds in aid of religion also may serve to entangle
government and religion.2" This arises in equal access to public school
decisions when considering the light and heat needed at the student meetings
and the salary paid to the government employee who must monitor the
meetings. It is difficult to consider these expenses as "benefits" to religion
when every other club receives them and a religious club will only be denied
them because of the content of its speech. These expenses are arguably not
even an accommodation since the school is not going out of its way to do
something for or give something to a religious group. Accommodation
implies that the government does something out of the ordinary to facilitate
religious beliefs, such as exempting Amish children from compulsory edu-
cation laws24 or granting tax exemptions to religious organizations. 2 " If a
school gives light, heat and faculty monitors to all organizations, they are
required to do the same for a religious group. Furthermore, even if this
were considered an accommodation, the expenditures are certainly de minimis
and cannot be construed to constitute an excessive entanglement between
government and religion.
Overall, any threat of an establishment clause violation derives from the
minimal expenditures the state must exert in order to accommodate the
meetings of student religious groups. If this de minimis threat is held to
outweigh the first amendment rights of high school students then certainly
the rights of high school students have become illusory.
IV. IMPACT
Perhaps one of the greatest and most onerous effects of upholding the
EAA and implementing a policy of equal access would be the possible onset
of "hate groups" wishing to meet on public high school premises. 2'4 7 Under
the Act, groups such as the KKK, the Nazi party or the Society for Satan
Worship would have to be granted access to school classrooms. Denying
access to these groups would be an impermissible prior restraint on speech.
243. Id.
244. Teitel, supra note 121, at 562-65.
245. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
246. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
247. See Note, The Equal Access Act: A Haven for High School "Hate Groups"?, 13
HOFSTRA L. REV. 589 (1985) (EAA greatly enhances the likelihood of hate groups meeting in
public secondary schools since the Act limits the schools' authority to restrict a forum once it
has been created).
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If the groups were to cause disruption, however, the speech could be restricted
under Tinker24 or under the provisions of the Act itself.249 The onset of hate
groups, while an unpleasant consequence of equal access, is somewhat
unlikely to occur. In order to be protected under the Act, any group wishing
to meet must be student initiated. "Hate groups" cannot send representatives
to high schools in order to start a club at a given high school. Perhaps some
isolated hate groups will form at certain high schools, but this threat is a
small price to pay in exchange for giving our high school students a forum
for the free exchange of ideas and the opportunity to be exposed to as many
viewpoints as possible.
Another possible effect of upholding the EAA would be that several
schools may decide to eliminate student activities programs entirely. Public
schools are not required to allow any groups or clubs to form and even at
schools where student activities programs already exist and several groups
have already formed, the school can still eliminate the forum entirely. 20 It
is difficult, however, to imagine any school board which would eliminate an
entire student activities program merely to prohibit a religious or other
undesirable group from meeting on its facilities. Such action would likely
meet opposition from that school's community since student activities pro-
grams are important for the educational and social development of high
school students.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to Mergens25' and may clear the air
in regards to equal access to public high school decisions by upholding
Mergens and establishing a new establishment clause test that will provide
consistency in church and state analysis. Eliminating the first prong of the
Lemon test would represent a step in that direction by focusing establishment
clause analysis on the effect of a given policy rather than leaving courts
guessing as to the subjective intent of legislators.
Affirming Mergens would also reaffirm the first amendment rights of high
school students which have recently suffered severe setbacks. High school
students are young adults and while there are several valid reasons for not
granting them the same rights as adults in an open forum, there are,
nevertheless, more reasons for honoring the constitutional rights that they
possess and which have been recognized by the Supreme Court. High schools
train the future leaders of the world and exposing students to an open forum
for the exchange of ideas is certainly better preparation for participation in
the "real world" than censoring every word and action in the high school
setting. "The classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas.' The Nation's
248. Under Tinker a public high school may restrict the expressive activity of students if
such restriction is necessary to avoid a substantial interference with school discipline or the
rights of other students. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503,
514 (1969).
249. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(c)(4) (Supp. H 1984).
250. See supra notes 24-28 and accompanying text (a limited open forum only exists where
the government intends to create it and the government can eliminate the forum at any time).
251. Mergens v. Board of Educ., 109 S. Ct. 3240, 3240 (1988).
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future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust
exchange of ideas which discovers truth 'out of a multitude of tongues,
[rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection."' 2 2
V. CONCLUSION
The first amendment and free exercise rights of the students in Mergens
certainly outweigh the threat of an establishment clause violation. The Equal
Access Act is an effort by Congress to let student religious groups meet in
public high schools; to "get religion back in the schools," so to speak. A
predominant religious motivation, however, should not be enough to strike
down legislation which has the neutral effect of preserving the free speech
and free exercise rights of high school students. The Lemon test needs to be
restructured so that the actual effect of state action is measured in deter-
mining establishment clause violations rather than the subjective intent behind
the drafting of statutes or policies. Eliminating the first prong of the Lemon
test would take a big step towards clearing up church and state analysis
which, to date, has been subjective and inconsistent at best.
VI. POSTSCRIPT: THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
On June 4, 1990, the Supreme Court handed down its decison in Mer-
gens.213 Although eight Justices agreed that Westside High School had vio-
lated the EAA and that the Act did not violate the establishment clause, the
case produced four separate opinions.
A. Justice O'Connor's Opinion
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White,
Blackmun, Scalia and Kennedy first addressed the language of the EAA. In
particular, the majority focused on defining a "noncurriculum related student
group" under the Act. 254
Interestingly, the Court actually did so by defining a "curriculum related
student group." The Court, working from both dictionary definitions of
"curriculum" and the EAA's definition of a "meeting," concluded that a
"curriculum related student group" must have a "direct relationship" to
the courses taught at a school. 2"1 A student group will be deemed "curriculum
related":
if the subject matter of the group is actually taught, or will soon be
taught, in a regularly offered course; if the subject matter of the group
concerns the body of courses as a whole; if participation in the group is
252. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (citing United States v.
Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (1943)).
253. Board of Ed. v. Mergens, 1990 U.S. LEXIS 2880 (June 4, 1990).
254. Id. at *20.
255. Id. at *21-22.
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required for a particular course; or if participation in the group results in
academic credit. 256
The majority then gave examples of different types of clubs. Curriculum
related clubs might include: A French club, if French was or were soon to
be taught at a school; student government, if its activities related to the
entire body of courses offered at a school; the school band, if participation
is required for a music class or is offered for credit.2 "5 Conversely, service-
oriented clubs, such as Zonta and Interact, would be classified as noncur-
riculum related student groups.2 8
Because Westside had allowed noncurriculum groups to meet before and
after classes, the majority found that Westside had created a "limited open
forum" under the Act and could not deny similar access to religious groups .219
The majority explicitly rested its decision on statutory grounds, leaving open
the question of whether the result would have been the same under the first
amendment by itself.260
After finding that Westside had triggered the EAA by creating a limited
open forum, the Court turned to the question of whether the Act violated
the establishment clause. Justice O'Connor, writing for herself, Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices White and Blackmun, held that the arguments which
validated equal access to university facilities in Widmar also applied to high
schools under the EAA. 2 6 1 The plurality found that the purpose of preventing
discrimination on religious grounds was secular.26 2 In addition, the plurality
cited three reasons why the EAA did not have the effect of advancing
religion. First, the plurality found that high school students were mature
enough to understand that high schools, by allowing access to religious
groups, were not endorsing religious views. 263 Second, the Act explicitly
limited the involvement of school officials in meetings of religious clubs.2 64
Third, the fact that Westside recognized a wide variety of clubs prevented
students from inferring a message of endorsement.2 65 Finally, the plurality
256. Id. at *24-25.
257. Id. at 25.
258. See id. at *25-26, *33-35. A more comprehensive list of clubs at Westside which were
deemed curriculum related by the Court can be found at *36.
The majority acknowledged that they had formulated a broad definition for noncurriculum
related student groups. The majority offered two suggestions for schools who wish to avoid
triggering the EAA. Schools may offer courses that would allow directly related clubs to qualify
as curriculum related. Schools also have the legal authority to ban meetings which would
interfere with the school's educational activities. Id. at *26-27. The majority did not address
the possibility that schools may choose a path of least resistance, namely, to simply close the
forum to all groups. See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
259. 1990 U.S. LEXIS 2880, at *37.
260. Id.
261. Id. at *40.
262. Id.
263. Id. at *42-43.
264. Id. at *44.
265. Id. at *45-46.
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
held that the EAA did not create an excessive entanglement of government
with religion because the Act prohibited both participation in club meetings
by faculty monitors and official school sponsorship of religious meetings.2 s6
B. Justice Kennedy's Concurrence
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Scalia, filed an opinion concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment of the Court. While these two justices
agreed with the majority's construction of the EAA,2 67 they disagreed with
the plurality's establishment clause analysis. Writing that "endorsement
cannot be the test[,] ' 2 6 because religious activities on school property imply
endorsement, Justices Kennedy and Scalia would require instead that gov-
ernment refrain from giving direct benefits to a religious group or coercing
students to engage in religious activities. 269
C. Justice Marshall's Concurrence
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, agreed with the majority's
definition of noncurriculum related student groups. Justice Marshall's con-
currence, however, emphasized the differences between the forums created
by the EAA and the forum recognized in Widmar.20 In particular, the
concurrence noted that the forum recognized in Widmar had already been
an open forum to over 100 student groups, including political groups. 27 1 In
contrast, Westside did not previously recognize any club with a controversial
viewpoint. Moreover, Westside encouraged participation in student clubs as
part of its broader educational mission, which included the inculcation of
values necessary to representative democracy. 272
Justice Marshall drew two conclusions from the difference in the two
institutions' educational missions. First, where an institution does not have
a forum open to a broad spectrum of viewpoints, a religion club which "is
the sole advocacy-oriented group in the forum, or one of a very limited
number," official encouragement of participation in student clubs may be
construed as an endorsement of religion. 273 Second, if the forum is not
employed by a diversity of groups, "a religious club could provide a fertile
ground for peer pressure" amounting to endorsement where the state has
266. Id. at *47-48.
267. Id. at *56. Nevertheless, it is interesting that Justices Kennedy and Scalia expressly leave
open the question of whether high schools must meet all of the "fair opportunity criteria" of
section 4071(c). The concurrence thus suggests that, for example, faculty might be able to
participate in the meetings of religious clubs. See id. at *58.
268. Id. at *60.
269. Id. at *58.
270. Id. at *62-63.
271. Id. at *66-67.
272. Id. at *67-68.
273. Id. at *69.
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"structured the school environment. ' 274
Consequently, the concurrence suggests that Westside, and presumably
any similar school, take active steps to ensure that the school is not seen as
endorsing religion. Not only should faculty members be prohibited from
participating in religious club meetings, but the school should also either
discontinue its policy of encouraging participation in clubs or expressly
disclaim endorsement of religious clubs.
275
D. Justice Steven's Dissent
Justice Stevens was the lone dissenter in this decision, and relied heavily
on his interpretation of congressional intent in passing the EAA, 276 a method
rejected by the majority due to the confused way in which the Act was
passed. 277 Justice Stevens agreed with some of the majority's general state-
ments in discerning the congressional intent behind the EAA.2 7s Nevertheless,
these general proposition led Justice Stevens to infer that the term "non-
curriculum related student group" should be interpreted as "ensur[ing] that
the rule of Widmar applied to high schools as it did to colleges[.]
' 27 9
Thus, the dissent would extend Widmar to high schools only if the forum
at Westside were comparable to the forum at issue in Widmar and the EAA
did not violate the establishment clause. 210 Justice Stevens then pointed out
the differences between the two forums which were discussed in Justice
Marshall's concurrence. 2 ' These differences led Justice Stevens to define a
"noncurriculum related student group" as a club which "has as its purpose
(or as part of its purpose) the advocacy of partisan theological, political or
ethical views. '212 In Justice Stevens' opinion, a high school could not validly
discriminate among controversial viewpoints, but Justice Stevens did not feel
that Westside had done so "by recognizing clubs like Swim Timing Team
and Subsurfers which, though they may not correspond directly to anything
in Westside's course offerings, are no more controversial that a grilled cheese
sandwich.''283
274. Id. at *73, *74.
275. Id. at *75-76.
276. Id. at *88-99.
277. Id. at *30.
278. Id. at *78.
279. Id. at *79-80. On this point, the majority held that the statute created a "limited open
forum" which differed from the Court's "limited public forum" doctrine. See id. at *28-29.
Justice Stevens argued that the difference was unintentional. Id. at *98.
280. Id. at *81.
281. Id. at *81-85.
282. Id. at *86.
283. Id. at *86. The dissent is quite concerned with the possible introduction of controversial
viewpoints into the high school forum, stating that "[n]othing in Widmar implies that the
existence of a French club, for example, would create [a] constitutional obligation to allow
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Although Justice Stevens, by concluding that Westside had not triggered
the EAA, did not need to address whether the Act violated the establishment
clause,'" he did not feel the issue required more careful analysis than the
majority had provided. In particular, the dissent stressed the "special sen-
sitivity" the Court had previously shown when applying the establishment
clause to primary and secondary public shcools. 285 The dissent also argued
that the students' first amendment rights could be restrained because the
religious club was seeking affirmative support from the school in expressing
its opinions, rather than merely the prevention of school interference with
that expression.286
Frank Calabrese
student members of the Ku Klux Klan or the Communist Party to have access to school
facilities." Id. at *87 (footnote omitted). The danger of high schools being invaded by the Klan
is not illegitimate. See supra note 247 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, school officials are
not without legal authority to prevent the ill effects of such an invasion. See supra notes 248-
49 and accompanying text.
More interesting on this point is Justice Stevens' later elaboration of the distinction between
viewpoint-based discrimination and a blanket exclusion of controversial speech. Justice Stevens
wrote that "the fact that the history of the Republican party might be taught in a political
science course could not justify a decision to allow the young Republicans to form a club while
denying Communists, white supremacists, or Christian Scientists the same privilege." 1990 U.S.
LEXIS 2880, at *88. It would not be surprising if the Christian Scientists or other religious
groups were to be offended by being lumped in with communists and white supremacists, a
characterization which lends further support to Professor Laycock's argument that Justice
Stevens' opinions in religion cases are seemingly motivated by a hostility toward religion.
Laycock, Formal Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L.
REv. 993 (1990).
284. 1990 U.S. LEXIS 2880, at *99.
285. Id. at *102.
286. Id. at *103 n.22 (comparing Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988),
which allowed a principal to edit a school newspaper with Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), which prohibited a school from banning
armbands worn by students protesting american involvement in Vietnam).
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